Fake Chilean court and Treasury notices: an Azure-hosted malware delivery campaign
Six lures impersonating Chile's Treasury, judiciary and AFC lead to 19 cloaked Azure VMs that deliver a ZIP/.lnk: attack chain, timeline, IOCs and detection.

- cloaked Azure VMs
- 19
- lures in Spanish and Portuguese
- 6
- first known email
- 15 Sep 2026
- AV detections per VM
- 0–2 / 90+
In short. Since 15 September 2026, a Windows malware delivery campaign has targeted organisations in Chile, and also in Portugal, with six lures: a court summons, a shared document, WeTransfer and «Um contacto partilhou» (in Portuguese), a debt-collection notice from the Chilean Treasury (TGR), the judiciary's «Oficina Judicial Virtual» and a pension-debt notice from AFC. The emails go out through compromised legitimate mailboxes and residential proxies; since 9 November they also arrive as PDF attachments. All of them lead to 19 known Azure virtual machines (*.cloudapp.azure.com; 17 live on 13 November) that hide from scanners and antivirus engines and deliver a ZIP archive with a .lnk shortcut, only to desktop visitors in Chile. This note covers the attack chain, the timeline, our confidence in each claim, the indicators (TLP:CLEAR) and detection rules. A plain-language explanation in Spanish is on our blog.
Scope
Our analysis was passive only: we did not interact with the actor's infrastructure. As a company decision, we publish results, not the method we used to discover and link the infrastructure. We do not identify victims or the third parties whose accounts the attacker abused. Data as of 13 November 2026.
Lures
| Lure | Typical subject or file name | Language | Since |
|---|---|---|---|
| Court summons | «Ref xxxx – Atención Ciudadano … Citación para comparecimiento ante el tribunal de justicia» | ES | 15 Sep |
| Shared document | «Documento_Compartido_xxxxxx.pdf!» followed by the recipient's address | ES | 15 Oct |
| Shared files | «Um contacto partilhou alguns documento(s) consigo» · «WeTransfer – Documento_partilhado_xxxxxx.pdf!» | PT | 16 Oct |
| TGR debt collection | «Notificacion de Cobro Judicial - TGR» | ES | 21 Oct |
| Judiciary | «Notificación Electrónica» with share.google short links and, since 5 Nov, a fake «Oficina Judicial Virtual» portal | ES | 26 Oct |
| AFC pension debt | «Su deuda previsional se encuentra en etapa prejudicial» | ES | 6 Nov |
Landing: fake viewers on Azure
- 19 known VMs under
*.cloudapp.azure.com(eastus, eastus2 and westus) named<prefix>-<8 hex>:pdf-,pdf-viewer-,f-pdf-,b-pdf-,pjud-,pejud-andoficinajudicialvirtual-. The first one appears on 9 September. They are created in batches a few days before each wave. The actor kept the old ones running until 12 November, when two of them disappeared; 17 are still live. - Cloaking: scanners and off-target visitors are redirected to a national Google page (google.com.br on almost all VMs, google.cl on the November ones). Mobile visitors get a «Desktop only access» gate.
- Almost no detection: on public reputation services, the VMs score between 0 and 2 detections out of 90+ engines (one scores 9), and the campaign's emails and PDFs score 0.
- Payload: a ZIP archive with a
.lnkshortcut, documented by an external analyst (see Sources). We do not hold a sample.
Attack chain
| Phase (MITRE ATT&CK) | Technique | What we observed |
|---|---|---|
| Resource development | T1586.002 Compromised email accounts | Authenticated SMTP from legitimate third-party mailboxes on hosting providers in several countries. SPF, DKIM and DMARC pass. |
| Resource development | T1583.006 Web services | Azure VMs under *.cloudapp.azure.com (eastus, eastus2, westus) named <prefix>-<8 hex>, deployed in batches. |
| Initial access | T1566.002 Spearphishing link | From shows the institution's name with an unrelated domain; Reply-To is the institution's real address; one link to the VM. |
| Initial access | T1566.001 Spearphishing attachment | Since 9 Nov, a PDF «Fwd_ Documento_Compartido_<6>.pdf» that only carries a link to the VM. |
| Defense evasion | T1656 Impersonation | Six lures (see above), two of them in Portuguese. |
| Defense evasion | User-agent and geo cloaking | Scanners and off-target visitors land on Google; mobile visitors see a «desktop only» gate. |
| Execution | T1204.002 Malicious file | ZIP with a .lnk shortcut, served only to desktop visitors in Chile (see «Confidence»). |
Sending infrastructure
- Compromised mailboxes: each wave goes out through real third-party accounts, so sender-domain reputation does not help. We do not name the affected third parties.
- Residential and bandwidth-sharing proxies: the authenticating IPs change country with every email and do not locate the operator. The IP declared in the 23 October wave is associated with a client of a paid bandwidth-sharing app (*proxyware*), so it is a borrowed node rather than the actor's own infrastructure (medium confidence).
- Mailer: built on .NET, it rotates the
X-Mailerheader (browser user agents) and declares a constant machine name in HELO:46.151.180[.]30in the 23 October wave andMiLLz3pin November.
Timeline
| Date (2026) | Event |
|---|---|
| 9 September | First known VM of the family |
| 15 September | First known email: court summons |
| 15 October | «Documento_Compartido» lure |
| 16–22 October | Portuguese lures: «Um contacto partilhou…» and WeTransfer |
| 21 and 23 October | TGR waves (HELO 46.151.180[.]30 on the 23rd) |
| 25 and 31 October | First judiciary lures |
| 27 October | First public report of the campaign (OTX pulse) |
| 5 November | VM oficinajudicialvirtual-… (judiciary) |
| 6 and 7 November | AFC and TGR waves with HELO MiLLz3p |
| 9 and 10 November | PDF attachments with links; a new VM in use; 18 VMs still up |
| 12 November | Another VM from the 9 November batch seen (pdf-b1f607a6); two September VMs gone; 17 VMs live |
Confidence
| Claim | Confidence | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| The TGR, AFC and judiciary emails come from one operator | High | Same landing infrastructure, same mailer, same VM family |
| The 19 VMs belong to the same campaign | High | Shared naming scheme, configuration and deployment patterns |
| The campaign started in mid-September with a fake court summons | High | Public emails from 15–29 Sep linking to the oldest VM |
| Since 9 Nov it also uses PDF attachments with links | High | Two public PDFs with the same naming pattern linking to a family VM |
| The payload is a ZIP with a Windows .lnk | Medium-high | Documented by an external analyst (see Sources); we did not download it |
| The kit comes from a Portuguese-speaking ecosystem (possibly Brazil) | Medium-low | Two Portuguese lures, victims in Portugal and historical redirects to google.com.br |
| Malware family and command-and-control server | Unknown | No public sample |
| Operator location | Undetermined | Uses proxies and third-party mailboxes |
Indicators (TLP:CLEAR)
Defanged on purpose. Azure IPs are reassigned when the actor releases a VM: use them only for retro-hunting, and block by hostname or by the pattern in the next section.
| Type | Indicator | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Host (live on 10 Nov) | pdf-56514c50.eastus.cloudapp.azure[.]com | TGR and AFC emails, 6 and 7 Nov |
| Host (live on 13 Nov) | pdf-bd74b9bd.eastus2.cloudapp.azure[.]com | 9 Nov batch |
| Host (live on 13 Nov) | pdf-b1f607a6.eastus.cloudapp.azure[.]com | 9 Nov batch, seen 12 Nov |
| Host | oficinajudicialvirtual-eab83510.westus.cloudapp.azure[.]com | Judiciary lure, 5 Nov |
| Host | pjud-be7bd0ec.westus.cloudapp.azure[.]com, pejud-38de5074.eastus2.cloudapp.azure[.]com | Judiciary lures, October |
| Host | pdf-538925b1.eastus, pdf-f9117d50.eastus, pdf-0bb4bcb5.eastus2, pdf-ff3b2f9d.eastus2 (.cloudapp.azure[.]com) | October and November |
| Host | pdf-viewer-687502b3.eastus, pdf-viewer-ccff92fd.eastus, pdf-viewer-d0bffedb.eastus2, pdf-viewer-aabcbcc8.eastus2, pdf-viewer-628843fd.westus | September and October |
| Host | f-pdf-6e9000f8.eastus2, b-pdf-fab7ad92.eastus2 | September and October |
| Host (gone on 12 Nov) | pdf-801bc101.eastus, pdf-viewer-e56777c1.eastus2 | September; retro-hunting only |
| IP (10 Nov) | 4.227.218[.]217, 20.97.238[.]71, 20.237.227[.]243, 20.230.31[.]62, 20.7.35[.]149 | Live VMs |
| IP (13 Nov) | 52.186.137[.]13 | VM pdf-b1f607a6 |
| HELO | MiLLz3p · 46.151.180[.]30 | Mailer |
| SHA-256 | f874ef05334f98d8480086f37ea3305ac52c26fb715f8e816ab8d53086ca2016 | HTML of the «desktop only» gate |
| SHA-256 | 89583a8d5d2ef9ec225cd8c1bb8291a8a9d2ce5c1a4bdd0bbd4fe31bfe047406 · f49888fa1bffb18dbc4dad4e402f0fd2068c5655e5c34e73e1d36383b8c3256e | «Documento_Compartido» PDFs, 9 and 10 Nov |
| SHA-256 | afb34df46903969455e704433acece8fc9ca3062e42338a464c13ac5b7efb6cb · e07b8265fd2961eee94fd38c7987bcdb54eab3f9bfa74c3bb183f719ba4351f9 | Court-summons emails, September |
| SHA-256 | 0d9f70a26e71cdbc19d4472249a5b441e1c8ab0f1518bbbd10852010f7a6f5ce · 9c37e1aae7f19148aef910db7deb0fd70a73b0d7e645d2f735b6c0bb898ae8d6 | Portuguese emails, October |
| SHA-256 | 7dd05e91533543b6bad4904f1ac4c58a73a110cec8641a867d62d9bb6cd55bbb · c90ebd5fbcc704da2655fdf715ca27627503347d3533007709861e24e87728a7 | TGR emails, 21 Oct and 3 Nov |
| Subject | «Notificacion de Cobro Judicial - TGR» · «Su deuda previsional se encuentra en etapa prejudicial» · «Citacion para comparecimiento ante el tribunal de justicia» · «Um contacto partilhou alguns documento(s) consigo» | Lures |
How to detect it
Indicators expire in days; behaviour lasts longer. Five hunting rules:
- Email: the
Fromshows a public institution's name but the domain is not a government one; theReply-Tois a Chilean government domain (tgr.cl,afc.cl,pjud.cl); and the body has a single link tocloudapp.azure.com. In Defender for Office 365, joinEmailEvents(sender and Reply-To) withEmailUrlInfo(link domain). - Attachments and subjects: names matching
Documento_(Compartido|partilhado)_[A-Za-z0-9]{6}\.pdf!, usually followed by the recipient's address, in the subject or in a PDF attachment's name. - DNS or proxy: lookups or browsing to hosts matching
^(b-|f-)?(pdf(-viewer)?|pjud|pejud|oficinajudicialvirtual)-[0-9a-f]{8}\.[a-z0-9]+\.cloudapp\.azure\.com$, especially minutes after an email is opened. - Endpoint: a
.lnkextracted from a.zipin Downloads that startscmd.exe,powershell.exe,mshta.exe,wscript.exeorrundll32.exeas a child ofexplorer.exe. - Preventive block: if your organisation does not use
*.cloudapp.azure.comfrom email, block the<prefix>-<8 hex>names by pattern and allow-list your own services.
Limitations
- We do not hold a sample of the payload, so the malware family and its command-and-control server remain unidentified.
- The VM list reflects what we knew on 13 November. The actor creates new VMs every few days.
Sources
- Public AlienVault OTX pulse that first documented the campaign, including the ZIP/.lnk payload: Phishing Chile – falso cobro TGR (27 Oct 2026).
- Press context (Spanish): The Clinic, 10 Nov 2026.
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