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TLP:CLEARPhishingMalware deliveryMicrosoft Azure

Fake Chilean court and Treasury notices: an Azure-hosted malware delivery campaign

Six lures impersonating Chile's Treasury, judiciary and AFC lead to 19 cloaked Azure VMs that deliver a ZIP/.lnk: attack chain, timeline, IOCs and detection.

aacunaa · Raiku Solutions7 min read
Laptop running Windows 11 showing a red “Malicious file” security warning
Photo: Ed Hardie on Unsplash · Licencia de Unsplash · edited
cloaked Azure VMs
19
lures in Spanish and Portuguese
6
first known email
15 Sep 2026
AV detections per VM
0–2 / 90+

In short. Since 15 September 2026, a Windows malware delivery campaign has targeted organisations in Chile, and also in Portugal, with six lures: a court summons, a shared document, WeTransfer and «Um contacto partilhou» (in Portuguese), a debt-collection notice from the Chilean Treasury (TGR), the judiciary's «Oficina Judicial Virtual» and a pension-debt notice from AFC. The emails go out through compromised legitimate mailboxes and residential proxies; since 9 November they also arrive as PDF attachments. All of them lead to 19 known Azure virtual machines (*.cloudapp.azure.com; 17 live on 13 November) that hide from scanners and antivirus engines and deliver a ZIP archive with a .lnk shortcut, only to desktop visitors in Chile. This note covers the attack chain, the timeline, our confidence in each claim, the indicators (TLP:CLEAR) and detection rules. A plain-language explanation in Spanish is on our blog.

Scope

Our analysis was passive only: we did not interact with the actor's infrastructure. As a company decision, we publish results, not the method we used to discover and link the infrastructure. We do not identify victims or the third parties whose accounts the attacker abused. Data as of 13 November 2026.

Lures

LureTypical subject or file nameLanguageSince
Court summons«Ref xxxx – Atención Ciudadano … Citación para comparecimiento ante el tribunal de justicia»ES15 Sep
Shared document«Documento_Compartido_xxxxxx.pdf!» followed by the recipient's addressES15 Oct
Shared files«Um contacto partilhou alguns documento(s) consigo» · «WeTransfer – Documento_partilhado_xxxxxx.pdf!»PT16 Oct
TGR debt collection«Notificacion de Cobro Judicial - TGR»ES21 Oct
Judiciary«Notificación Electrónica» with share.google short links and, since 5 Nov, a fake «Oficina Judicial Virtual» portalES26 Oct
AFC pension debt«Su deuda previsional se encuentra en etapa prejudicial»ES6 Nov

Landing: fake viewers on Azure

  • 19 known VMs under *.cloudapp.azure.com (eastus, eastus2 and westus) named <prefix>-<8 hex>: pdf-, pdf-viewer-, f-pdf-, b-pdf-, pjud-, pejud- and oficinajudicialvirtual-. The first one appears on 9 September. They are created in batches a few days before each wave. The actor kept the old ones running until 12 November, when two of them disappeared; 17 are still live.
  • Cloaking: scanners and off-target visitors are redirected to a national Google page (google.com.br on almost all VMs, google.cl on the November ones). Mobile visitors get a «Desktop only access» gate.
  • Almost no detection: on public reputation services, the VMs score between 0 and 2 detections out of 90+ engines (one scores 9), and the campaign's emails and PDFs score 0.
  • Payload: a ZIP archive with a .lnk shortcut, documented by an external analyst (see Sources). We do not hold a sample.

Attack chain

Phase (MITRE ATT&CK)TechniqueWhat we observed
Resource developmentT1586.002 Compromised email accountsAuthenticated SMTP from legitimate third-party mailboxes on hosting providers in several countries. SPF, DKIM and DMARC pass.
Resource developmentT1583.006 Web servicesAzure VMs under *.cloudapp.azure.com (eastus, eastus2, westus) named <prefix>-<8 hex>, deployed in batches.
Initial accessT1566.002 Spearphishing linkFrom shows the institution's name with an unrelated domain; Reply-To is the institution's real address; one link to the VM.
Initial accessT1566.001 Spearphishing attachmentSince 9 Nov, a PDF «Fwd_ Documento_Compartido_<6>.pdf» that only carries a link to the VM.
Defense evasionT1656 ImpersonationSix lures (see above), two of them in Portuguese.
Defense evasionUser-agent and geo cloakingScanners and off-target visitors land on Google; mobile visitors see a «desktop only» gate.
ExecutionT1204.002 Malicious fileZIP with a .lnk shortcut, served only to desktop visitors in Chile (see «Confidence»).

Sending infrastructure

  • Compromised mailboxes: each wave goes out through real third-party accounts, so sender-domain reputation does not help. We do not name the affected third parties.
  • Residential and bandwidth-sharing proxies: the authenticating IPs change country with every email and do not locate the operator. The IP declared in the 23 October wave is associated with a client of a paid bandwidth-sharing app (*proxyware*), so it is a borrowed node rather than the actor's own infrastructure (medium confidence).
  • Mailer: built on .NET, it rotates the X-Mailer header (browser user agents) and declares a constant machine name in HELO: 46.151.180[.]30 in the 23 October wave and MiLLz3p in November.

Timeline

Date (2026)Event
9 SeptemberFirst known VM of the family
15 SeptemberFirst known email: court summons
15 October«Documento_Compartido» lure
16–22 OctoberPortuguese lures: «Um contacto partilhou…» and WeTransfer
21 and 23 OctoberTGR waves (HELO 46.151.180[.]30 on the 23rd)
25 and 31 OctoberFirst judiciary lures
27 OctoberFirst public report of the campaign (OTX pulse)
5 NovemberVM oficinajudicialvirtual-… (judiciary)
6 and 7 NovemberAFC and TGR waves with HELO MiLLz3p
9 and 10 NovemberPDF attachments with links; a new VM in use; 18 VMs still up
12 NovemberAnother VM from the 9 November batch seen (pdf-b1f607a6); two September VMs gone; 17 VMs live

Confidence

ClaimConfidenceBasis
The TGR, AFC and judiciary emails come from one operatorHighSame landing infrastructure, same mailer, same VM family
The 19 VMs belong to the same campaignHighShared naming scheme, configuration and deployment patterns
The campaign started in mid-September with a fake court summonsHighPublic emails from 15–29 Sep linking to the oldest VM
Since 9 Nov it also uses PDF attachments with linksHighTwo public PDFs with the same naming pattern linking to a family VM
The payload is a ZIP with a Windows .lnkMedium-highDocumented by an external analyst (see Sources); we did not download it
The kit comes from a Portuguese-speaking ecosystem (possibly Brazil)Medium-lowTwo Portuguese lures, victims in Portugal and historical redirects to google.com.br
Malware family and command-and-control serverUnknownNo public sample
Operator locationUndeterminedUses proxies and third-party mailboxes

Indicators (TLP:CLEAR)

Defanged on purpose. Azure IPs are reassigned when the actor releases a VM: use them only for retro-hunting, and block by hostname or by the pattern in the next section.

TypeIndicatorNote
Host (live on 10 Nov)pdf-56514c50.eastus.cloudapp.azure[.]comTGR and AFC emails, 6 and 7 Nov
Host (live on 13 Nov)pdf-bd74b9bd.eastus2.cloudapp.azure[.]com9 Nov batch
Host (live on 13 Nov)pdf-b1f607a6.eastus.cloudapp.azure[.]com9 Nov batch, seen 12 Nov
Hostoficinajudicialvirtual-eab83510.westus.cloudapp.azure[.]comJudiciary lure, 5 Nov
Hostpjud-be7bd0ec.westus.cloudapp.azure[.]com, pejud-38de5074.eastus2.cloudapp.azure[.]comJudiciary lures, October
Hostpdf-538925b1.eastus, pdf-f9117d50.eastus, pdf-0bb4bcb5.eastus2, pdf-ff3b2f9d.eastus2 (.cloudapp.azure[.]com)October and November
Hostpdf-viewer-687502b3.eastus, pdf-viewer-ccff92fd.eastus, pdf-viewer-d0bffedb.eastus2, pdf-viewer-aabcbcc8.eastus2, pdf-viewer-628843fd.westusSeptember and October
Hostf-pdf-6e9000f8.eastus2, b-pdf-fab7ad92.eastus2September and October
Host (gone on 12 Nov)pdf-801bc101.eastus, pdf-viewer-e56777c1.eastus2September; retro-hunting only
IP (10 Nov)4.227.218[.]217, 20.97.238[.]71, 20.237.227[.]243, 20.230.31[.]62, 20.7.35[.]149Live VMs
IP (13 Nov)52.186.137[.]13VM pdf-b1f607a6
HELOMiLLz3p · 46.151.180[.]30Mailer
SHA-256f874ef05334f98d8480086f37ea3305ac52c26fb715f8e816ab8d53086ca2016HTML of the «desktop only» gate
SHA-25689583a8d5d2ef9ec225cd8c1bb8291a8a9d2ce5c1a4bdd0bbd4fe31bfe047406 · f49888fa1bffb18dbc4dad4e402f0fd2068c5655e5c34e73e1d36383b8c3256e«Documento_Compartido» PDFs, 9 and 10 Nov
SHA-256afb34df46903969455e704433acece8fc9ca3062e42338a464c13ac5b7efb6cb · e07b8265fd2961eee94fd38c7987bcdb54eab3f9bfa74c3bb183f719ba4351f9Court-summons emails, September
SHA-2560d9f70a26e71cdbc19d4472249a5b441e1c8ab0f1518bbbd10852010f7a6f5ce · 9c37e1aae7f19148aef910db7deb0fd70a73b0d7e645d2f735b6c0bb898ae8d6Portuguese emails, October
SHA-2567dd05e91533543b6bad4904f1ac4c58a73a110cec8641a867d62d9bb6cd55bbb · c90ebd5fbcc704da2655fdf715ca27627503347d3533007709861e24e87728a7TGR emails, 21 Oct and 3 Nov
Subject«Notificacion de Cobro Judicial - TGR» · «Su deuda previsional se encuentra en etapa prejudicial» · «Citacion para comparecimiento ante el tribunal de justicia» · «Um contacto partilhou alguns documento(s) consigo»Lures

How to detect it

Indicators expire in days; behaviour lasts longer. Five hunting rules:

  • Email: the From shows a public institution's name but the domain is not a government one; the Reply-To is a Chilean government domain (tgr.cl, afc.cl, pjud.cl); and the body has a single link to cloudapp.azure.com. In Defender for Office 365, join EmailEvents (sender and Reply-To) with EmailUrlInfo (link domain).
  • Attachments and subjects: names matching Documento_(Compartido|partilhado)_[A-Za-z0-9]{6}\.pdf!, usually followed by the recipient's address, in the subject or in a PDF attachment's name.
  • DNS or proxy: lookups or browsing to hosts matching ^(b-|f-)?(pdf(-viewer)?|pjud|pejud|oficinajudicialvirtual)-[0-9a-f]{8}\.[a-z0-9]+\.cloudapp\.azure\.com$, especially minutes after an email is opened.
  • Endpoint: a .lnk extracted from a .zip in Downloads that starts cmd.exe, powershell.exe, mshta.exe, wscript.exe or rundll32.exe as a child of explorer.exe.
  • Preventive block: if your organisation does not use *.cloudapp.azure.com from email, block the <prefix>-<8 hex> names by pattern and allow-list your own services.

Limitations

  • We do not hold a sample of the payload, so the malware family and its command-and-control server remain unidentified.
  • The VM list reflects what we knew on 13 November. The actor creates new VMs every few days.

Sources

Facing an AiTM phishing campaign?

We investigate suspicious emails and sign-ins, contain compromised accounts and hunt for the same infrastructure in your Microsoft 365 tenant.